Abstract. In this work we present the first distributed storage system that is provably robust against crash failures issued by an adaptive adversary, i.e., for each batch of requests the adversary can decide based on the entire system state which servers will be unavailable for that batch of requests. Despite up to γn 1/ log log n crashed servers, with γ > 0 constant and n denoting the number of servers, our system can correctly process any batch of lookup and write requests (with at most a polylogarithmic number of requests issued at each non-crashed server) in at most a polylogarithmic number of communication rounds, with at most polylogarithmic time and work at each server and only a logarithmic storage overhead.
Introduction
One of the main challenges of a distributed system is that it is able to work correctly even if parts of the system fail to work. If a server experiences a crash failure it becomes unavailable to the other servers, i.e., it does not issue or respond to requests any more. Crash failures can be temporary or permanent, and if it is temporary, a server may either be back to its state when it crashed, or it may have lost all of its state. We will focus on crash failures where, whenever a server becomes available again, it is back to its state when it crashed. This is a reasonable assumption since for commercial servers it is extremely rare that their state cannot be recovered. However, a temporary unavailability is not that uncommon and can have many causes such as maintenance work, hardware or software glitches, or denial-of-service attacks. Especially denial-of-service attacks can are bounded. In addition, we use the synchronous model because describing all protocols in an asynchronous setting would significantly blow up the construction and would hide the main innovations behind our system. We assume that the time needed for internal computations is negligible, which is reasonable as the operations in the protocols we describe are simple enough to satisfy this property.
For the crash failures, we assume a batch-based adaptive adversary. This means the following: We assume that time is divided into periods consisting of a polylogarithmic number of rounds. The adversary has complete knowledge of the current system, but cannot predict the (future) random choices of the system. Based on his knowledge, he can select an arbitrary set of O(n 1/ log log n ) servers to be crashed. A server that is crashed will not send any message nor react to messages sent from other servers. We assume that the servers have a failure detector that allows them to determine whether a server is crashed so that statements like "if server i is crashed then . . . " are allowed in the protocol. Note that assuming bounded message delays, failure detection can simply be implemented using timeouts. After that, the adversary may issue an arbitrary collection of requests to the system by sending up to ω ∈ N lookup(·) requests and up to ω write(·) requests to each server. In order to keep the presentation of RoBuSt as clear as possible, throughout this work we assume ω = 1. RoBuSt can in principle handle arbitrary values of ω, but in that case the bound on the work required by each server for serving all requests must be multiplied with ω.
2 There are no further limitations, i.e., the keys selected by the adversary may or may not be associated with data items stored in the system, and the adversary is also allowed to issue multiple lookup requests for the same key. The task of the system is to correctly handle all of these requests. We assume that any period is long enough such that the system has enough time to perform all necessary computations and to answer all requests. After any period, the adversary may select a different set of Θ(n 1/ log log n ) servers to be crashed. We assume that the set of crashed servers does not change during a fixed period, which is why we use the notion of a batch-based adaptive adversary. Of course, allowing crash failures at arbitrary times would make the model much stronger, yet it would significantly complicate the system design, which is why we leave this to future research. Note that we assume links between intact (i.e., non-crashed) servers to be reliable. Unreliable links can be dealt with using, for example, at-least-once delivery or error correction strategies, which are out of scope for our design since it is already complex enough.
In order to measure the quality of the storage system, we introduce the following notation. A storage strategy is said to have a redundancy of r if r times more storage (including any control storage) is used for the data than storing the plain data. We call a storage system scalable if its redundancy is at most polylog(n), efficient if any collection of lookup and write requests specified by the adversary can be processed correctly in at most polylog(n) many communication rounds in which every server sends and receives at most polylog(n) many messages of at most polylog(n) size, and robust if any collection of lookup and write requests specified by the adversary can be processed correctly even if a set of up to Θ(n 1/ log log n ) servers specified by the adversary crash. In the appendix we provide a glossary that gives an overview of variables and terms frequently used in this work.
Related Work
Over the past years, distributed storage systems have gained a lot of importance. Popular examples include the storage solutions offered by Google, Apple, or Amazon. Since availability and retrievability of the stored data is a key aspect of distributed storage systems, these systems should be able to work correctly despite common failures. Often failures in distributed systems are divided into the following types [5] : crash failures, omission failures, timing failures, and Byzantine failures. In crash failures the affected component (for instance a server) completely stops working. In receive (send) omission failures the affected component cannot receive (send) any further messages. A timing failure leads a component to not respond within a specified time interval. In case of a Byzantine failure, the affected component may react in an arbitrary, even malicious manner.
This work focuses on crash failures. Many works dealing with crash failures in distributed systems focus on crash failure recovery and crash failure detection [15, 12, 8] . But to the best of our knowledge, no previous work has considered how to secure a distributed storage system against many (e.g., more than a polylogarithmic number) simultaneous crash failures controlled by an adaptive adversary while using only polylogarithmic work, time and redundancy. That is, we do not seek to prevent failures or attacks, but rather focus on how to maintain a good availability and performance even in spite of them. Our system is based on the distributed hash table (DHT) paradigm (e.g., [3, 6, 9, 14, 16] ), with the additional twist of using coding and arranging the used DHTs in an appropriate structure. Various systems based on DHTs that are resistant against Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks (which represent a special type of crash failures) have already been proposed [10, 11, 13] . But these do not work for adaptive adversaries. The first DHTs that are robust against past insider crash failures were proposed in [1, 2] , where a past insider only has complete knowledge of the information system up to some past time point t 0 . For this kind of insider, it is possible to design an information system so that any information that was inserted or last updated after t 0 is safe against crash failures [1, 2] . But the constructions proposed in these papers would not work at all for a current insider because they are heavily based on randomization to ensure unpredictability. Eikel and Scheideler were the first to present a distributed information system, called IRIS, that is provably robust even against a current insider that crashes up to Θ(n 1/ log log n ) servers. The authors showed that IRIS can correctly answer any set of lookup requests (with one request per server that is not crashed) with polylogarithmic time and work at each server and only a constant redundancy. Still it remained open whether it is possible to design a distributed storage system that can efficiently handle lookup and write requests under the presence of crash failures. We answer this question positively by proposing such a system.
Our Contribution
We present the first scalable distributed storage system, called Robust Bucket Storage (in short RoBuSt), that is provably robust against adaptive crash failures and that supports both lookup and write requests. Concretely, we allow the adversary to have complete knowledge about the storage system and to have the power to crash any set of γn 1/ log log n servers, for γ > 0 constant. The task of the system is to serve any collection of lookup and write requests in an efficient way despite the crash failures.
RoBuSt expands some of the ideas in IRIS, a distributed storage system that we proposed in SPAA 2013 [7] . The system presented in this work tolerates a number of crashed servers that is similar to the number of servers blocked by a DoS attack that the Basic IRIS version can tolerate and achieves comparable efficiency bounds (up to a logarithmic factor). In contrast to IRIS, which can only handle lookup requests, RoBuSt is able to additionally handle write requests. Although in the lookup protocol we are able to adapt some of the underlying ideas of IRIS, adding the write functionality required significant changes in the whole structure. To simplify the description for readers who are familiar with IRIS, we try to re-use terminology whenever there are similarities (e.g., Probing Stage, Decoding Stage).
One aspect is that IRIS organizes data into layers of n data items each, and each layer is encoded separately using distributed coding that involves all n servers. This means that whenever a data item needs an update, all n servers have to update their information for the corresponding layer. Since we allow any set of write requests, it may happen that every write request involves a different layer, which would create an enormous update work. To solve this issue, in RoBuSt we store the data items in so-called buckets that are organized in a binary tree. For each data item, there are a logarithmic number of buckets that are a potential storage location for the data item. For a data item there may exist different versions of it in different buckets. But our system ensures that the highest bucket (i.e., the bucket with minimum distance to the root in the underlying binary tree over the buckets) that contains a version of the data item always holds the most recent version.
Furthermore, IRIS uses a fixed set of hash functions to specify anchor locations for the data so that afterwards lookup requests can be served efficiently despite an adversarial DoS attack. However, using fixed hash functions in RoBust would enable the adversary to annul the fair distribution of data in a bucket. Therefore, RoBuSt chooses new, random hash functions whenever write requests have to be served.
Another complication is the fact that a server may not know whether its information is up-to-date. This is because at the time when write requests were executed that required an update in that server, the server might have been crashed. Our organization of the data and our protocols ensure that any server that answers a request always returns the most recent version of a data item.
Nevertheless, RoBuSt makes sure that all data can still be efficiently found while the storage overhead is at most a logarithmic factor. Theorem 1.1. RoBuSt is a scalable and efficient distributed storage system that only needs a logarithmic redundancy to protect itself against batch-based adaptive crash failures in which up to γ · n 1/ log log n servers can crash for a constant γ > 0, w.h.p.
Underlying Datastructure
In the following, we assume keys are potentially from an address space of size at most n p , i.e., we need Λ := p log n bits for each address. We introduce the following definitions: For a data item d, denote the address of d by key
Our data structure is based on a binary tree with Λ + 1 levels, so-called zones. We denote the nodes of each zone as buckets where each bucket will hold a set of data items. The internal storage strategy of the buckets is described in Section 2. In the following, let B be the set of all buckets and let bucket(z, d) : {0, . . . , Λ} × U → B be a function that returns the unique possible bucket of a data item d at zone z. Initially, a bucket does not contain any data. During the runtime of the system the following invariant is satisfied: Each bucket, excluding bucket B ε , stores either 0 or between n and 2n data items. Bucket B ε stores at most 2n data items.
Internal Storage Strategy of the Buckets
The idea of storing a set D of data items into a bucket B is to reuse the basic concepts of the storage strategy for individual layers from IRIS [7] . Roughly speaking this strategy works as follows: In order to achieve the desired robustness, we first create c ≥ 18 log m pieces d 1 , . . . , d c for each data item d ∈ D using Reed Solomon coding. Using c hash functions chosen uniformly and independently at random, these pieces are then mapped to servers. Finally, all these pieces are encoded with each other, such that at the end each intact server holds for each piece some parity information resulting from the encoding process. Besides encoded data pieces each bucket B additionally stores c hash functions and a timestamp t(B). The timestamp is used to handle out-dated information a server might hold if it has crashed in a previous period in which write requests were served.
In the following we roughly describe the coding strategy presented in [7] . The coding strategy is a block-based distributed strategy that follows the topology of a k-ary butterfly as described in the following. For k ∈ N we use the notation [k] = {0, . . . , k − 1}.
d and edge set E with
A node u of the form ( , x) is said to be on butterfly level of G. Furthermore, LT (u) is the unique k-ary tree of nodes reached from u when going downwards the butterfly (i.e., to nodes on butterfly levels > ) and U T (u) is the unique k-ary tree of nodes reached from u when going upwards the butterfly. Moreover, for a node u at level , let BF (u) be the unique k-ary sub-butterfly of dimension ranging from butterfly level 0 to in
A visualization of a k-ary butterfly can be found in the appendix. In the following let BF (k, d) be a k-ary butterfly with n = k d and with server s i , i ∈ {0, . . . , n − 1}, emulating the butterfly nodes (0, i), . . . , (d, i). That is, whenever a butterfly node (j, i), j ∈ {0, . . . , d} is supposed to perform an action or store data, this is done by server s i . We say a server s is connected via the k-ary butterfly to another server s , if there is an edge (u, v) in the butterfly such that u is emulated by s and v is emulated by s .
While in IRIS each server holds O(1) data pieces per layer, in our system each server holds O(log n) data pieces per bucket. This is due to the fact that each bucket contains O(n) data items and for each data item c = Θ(log m) pieces are created and distributed evenly among the servers. Hence, we simply concatenate the data pieces a server s i holds in a bucket B and denote the resulting data block as b i .
In order to encode the data blocks b 0 , . . . , b n−1 assigned to the servers s 0 , . . . , s n−1 in bucket B, initially, b i is placed in node (0, i) for every i ∈ {0, . . . , n − 1}. Given that in butterfly level we have already assigned data blocks d( , x) to the nodes ( , x) we use the coding strategy presented in [7] to assign data blocks d( + 1, x) to the nodes at butterfly level + 1. The used coding strategy is based on some simple parity computations and ensures the following property: If at most one butterfly node ( + 1, x j ) from the set of nodes {( +1, x 1 ), . . . , ( +1, x k )} is crashed, then the information in the remaining nodes ( + 1, x i ), i ∈ {1, . . . , k}\{j}, suffices to recover d( , x 1 ), . . . , d( , x k ). Furthermore, with Lemma 2.4 in [7] the storage amount of each server s i , i ∈ {0, . . . , n−1}, required for the encoding of a single bucket is upper bounded by (1 + e)z, where z denotes the maximum size of the data blocks stored at any server s j , j ∈ {0, . . . , n − 1}. Since there may exist outdated data items in the system, but for each level at most one, i.e. in total at most Λ + 1 = O(log n) many for each data item, the redundancy of our system increases to O(log n).
Corollary 2.2. RoBuSt has a redundancy of O(log n).

The Write Protocol
In the following let D with |D| ≤ (1 − δ)n and δ < 1/72 · n 1/ log log n , be the set of data items for which intact servers received write requests. For a data item d that is stored in the system denote the c pieces that have been created from d using Reed Solomon coding as d 1 , . . . , d c . Furthermore, denote the server that is holding d 1 (after the pieces have been spread over the n servers) as the server maintaining d.
Preprocessing Stage
In this stage, for each crashed server s i , a unique intact server is determined, denoted as the representative of s i , such that at the end of this stage each crashed server is the representative of at most two other servers. The idea of the representatives is to let them take over the roles of the according crashed servers in actions (e.g. routing, computations) the crashed servers were supposed to perform. For this, we additionally need to ensure that each intact server knows the representatives of all crashed servers it is connected to in the underlying k-ary butterfly.
The determination of the representatives and the introduction of the representatives to the appropriate servers can be done in the same manner as in the butterfly completion stage of [7] , which can be carried out in (2 + o(1)) log n rounds with a congestion of at most O(log n) (see Lemma 2.11 in [7] ). In contrast to [7] , we do not need to compute a so-called decoding depth here that gives information about the minimum level of the butterfly that the decoding must be initiated from, which would take O(log n) rounds. In the following, we denote by s(i) the representative of s i if s i is crashed or s i itself otherwise.
Writing Stage Overview
In order to keep the specification of our system simple, we first give a high-level overview of how a set of write requests is handled. Further details are given in the following subsection.
The Writing Stage consists of up to Λ+1 phases. Each phase z ∈ {0, . . . , Λ} deals with a single bucket B z from zone z only and receives a set of data items D z to be inserted into B z . At the beginning, D 0 := D is the set of all data items for which there are write requests. In the following, D(B z ) denotes the set of data items that are stored in bucket B z (at the beginning of phase z). Phase z ∈ {0, . . . , Λ} consists of the following steps. 
Else (|D(B
a) The intact servers agree on a subset D z+1 ⊆ D(B z )∪D of size n with the property that for all Each phase of the Writing Stage can be performed in O(log n) rounds with a congestion of O(log n) at each server in each round (see appendix). Since there are at most O(log n) phases in the Writing Stage, the overall runtime is O(log 2 n) rounds.
Encoding of a Bucket
In the following we describe how a set of data items is reencoded into a bucket, as required in step 2 and step 3b. Note that the reencoding of a bucket does not only consist of the simple encoding of the data items belonging to that bucket but it consists of some additional steps, as described in the following. First, in contrast to IRIS, s(1) chooses c hash functions h 1 , . . . , h c : U → V uniformly at random that will be used to map data pieces of this bucket to servers. While in IRIS the hash functions that map data pieces to servers are never changed, we need to choose new hash functions for a bucket B whenever B is (re)encoded. The reason for this is that otherwise the adversary would be able to generate write requests that overload certain servers.
Note that the hash functions need to satisfy certain expansion properties, but if c is chosen sufficiently large (c ≥ 18 log m) they do so, w.h.p. (see appendix). After that, s(1) distributes the c hash functions to all other intact servers s(i). This distribution can be realized by simply broadcasting the hash functions in the k-ary butterfly from level log k n to level 0. In addition, s 1 distributes a current timestamp t(B z ) to all other intact servers and each intact server s(i) sets its current timestamp for bucket B z to that value. Each server s(i) now creates for each data item which it maintains or which it has received write requests for and which are not propagated to the next phase the c pieces d 1 , . . . , d c of d using Reed Solomon coding (Section 2). Here, d j , j ∈ {1, . . . , c}, is supposed to be sent to the server s responsible for h j (d) or to its representative if s is crashed. Unfortunately, a server s(i) does not necessarily know the representative of the server s if that server is crashed. Thus, instead of sending the data pieces directly, the servers initiate a bottom-up routing in the underlying k-ary butterfly in order to determine the representative of h j (d) for each 1 ≤ j ≤ c. Obviously, this takes only log k n rounds and can be performed with a congestion of O(k) per node. Once s(i) knows the representative of
After the pieces of data items have been distributed, the servers encode the data items in (D(B z )∪D z )\D z+1 in a distributed fashion. Note that the set of data blocks for server i in zone z is completely overwritten for each server s(i) in this process. This can be done by a simple top-down approach using the coding strategy for IRIS (see Section 2.1 in [7] ). In addition, we also store the timestamp of the bucket along with the data block by appending it to the composed data block.
The following lemma holds during the encoding step, regardless of the current phase.
Lemma 3.1. Assume the adversary blocks less than (γ/2)·2 log k n servers, with γ = 1/36. Then, for any data item d that is (re-)written during the current period, and any level 0 ≤ ≤ log k n, there are at most c/6 pieces of d that are mapped to sub-butterflies BF (v) (for some v at level ) with at least 2
The lemma plays an important role in the proof of the correctness of the Lookup Protocol. A proof of this lemma can be found in the appendix.
The Lookup Protocol
In order to keep the specification of our system simple, we provide the description of the lookup protocol as a separate protocol that is executed after the execution of the Write Protocol. The lookup protocol is divided into two stages: the Preprocessing Stage (Section 4.1) and the Zone Examination Stage (Section 4.2). The former is similar to the Preprocessing Stage of the Write Protocol (Section 3.1). The latter is performed for each zone individually and split into two further stages: the Probing Stage and the Decoding Stage. The basic idea of the Probing Stage is to answer a request by directly collecting a sufficient number of data pieces. If this is not possible, either because too many of the servers holding a piece are crashed or because of congestion, the Decoding Stage tries to recover a data item by utilizing the distributed coding described in Section 2.1. Note that both a Probing Stage as well as a Decoding Stage can be found in IRIS ( [7] ), too. While they match in their general structure, there are important differences that are caused by the differences in the underlying structure and the implications of the write functionality. For example, servers may now store obsolete data items without being aware of that.
The Preprocessing Stage
The Preprocessing Stage is exactly the same as in Section 3.1. If at least one write request has been handled in the current period, we can thus skip this part and re-use the established k-ary butterfly and the unique representatives.
The Zone Examination Stage
In the following let D be the set of data items for which a lookup request arrived at an intact server. The idea of this stage is to successively perform a lookup for each d ∈ D in each zone until a copy of d has been found and returned to the appropriate server. The zone examination stage is performed for at most Λ + 1 zones starting with zone 0.
In each phase z ∈ {0, . . . , Λ}, beginning with z = 0, each server with an unserved lookup request for some data item d initiates a lookup request for d in bucket bucket(z, d). Any server that receives a copy of the data item it requested during the lookup in zone z, as described in the following, returns that copy and is finished. All remaining lookup requests are handled in the next phase, phase z := z + 1. This procedure is repeated until each lookup request is served.
Handling a set of lookup requests in one phase z is done by performing the Probing Stage and the Decoding Stage as described in the following.
Probing Stage
In the following let s be an intact server that has an unserved lookup request for a data item d at the beginning of phase z. The idea of the Probing Stage is to either achieve c/3 up-to-date pieces such that d can be recovered. Or to assign the request for d to a level {1, . . . , log k n} (as defined later) in order to further handle the request in the next stage, the Decoding Stage. In the following, for a server s , an index i ∈ {1, . . . , c}, and a data piece d we denote by P i (s , d ) the unique path of length log k n in the k-ary butterfly from the butterfly node on level log k n emulated by s to the butterfly node on level 0 emulated by the server that is responsible for h i (d ). For a visualization of this path and a single phase of the Probing Stage see the appendix.
On a high level view, in phase z, server s performs the following steps.
1. Acquire the current hash functions and the timestamp t d for bucket bucket(z, d). In the following we describe how the nodes from the paths P 1 (s 1 , d 1 ) , . . . , P c (s c , d c ) react on incoming messages during this phase. Let u be a butterfly node on level ∈ {0, . . . , log k n} that has received a probe(d, i, t d ) message. In order to reduce redundancy u combines probes for the same piece of d (and thus the same target) and u marks itself as the new origin of the probe (technique of splitting and combining [7] ). In the following we denote a butterfly node u as congested if it has received more than α · c probe(·) messages for different probes, for a sufficiently large constant α > 0. Whenever u receives a probe(d, i, t d ) message, u performs the following steps. If a butterfly node on level ∈ {0, . . . , log k n − 1} receives a data item, a fail(·), or a notexists(·) message, it forwards this answer to the origin of the request to which this message was an answer to (along the same path that the request was routed). A butterfly node on level log k n emulated by s(d i ), i ∈ {1, . . . , c}, that received an answer for a probe for data piece d i simply forwards this answer to the server that initiated the forwarding of that probe. These answers ensure that after O(log k n) rounds the server s that received a lookup request for a data item d has received for all initially sent probe(·) messages a piece of d, or a notexists(d) message, or the level at which the probing failed. Depending on which kinds of answers s has received, it reacts as follows:
Choose
• If s received at least c/3 up-to-date pieces of d, s recovers d using Reed Solomon coding and answers the request.
• Else if s receives a notexists(d) message, s answers that the requested data item does not exist in the system.
• Else if s receives more than c/3 fail(d, i, 0) messages, s declares the request for d to belong to level , where ∈ {0, . . . , log k n} is the smallest level that contains at least 5c/6 active probes for d i , i.e., probes for d i that were not aborted at level − 1 or earlier.
It is easy to see that the Probing Stage takes at most O(log n) communication rounds per phase with at most O(log 2 n) congestion at every server in each round. Since the only reason for a piece of a data item to be deactivated at level 0 is that it is outdated, the following is a direct corollary from Lemma 3.1. For the analysis of the runtime of the lookup protocol, the following lemma plays an important role. Lemma 4.2. If the adversary can only block less than (γ/2) · 2 log k n servers, then for every ∈ {1, . . . , log k n}, the number of data items belonging to level is at most 2γn/k with γ = 1/36.
The general idea and structure of the proof of Lemma 4.2 is based on the proof of Lemma 2.16 in [7] . In contrast to [7] , no requests are aborted due to crashed nodes here. Furthermore, we have a different definition of when a node belongs to level here (we require at least 5c/6 active probes instead of c/2) and a different value of γ. A proof of Lemma 4.2 can be found in the appendix.
Decoding Stage
The Decoding stage proceeds in log k n sub-phases. In the following, for a server s that holds a lookup request for some data item d that has answered before this sub-phase, we define s ( ) i (d) as the node at level on the unique path of length log k n from the butterfly node on level log k n emulated by s i (d) to the butterfly node on level 0 responsible for
On a high level view, the Decoding Stage works as follows: During each sub-phase 1 ≤ ≤ log k n, starting with level 1, we try to recover the data items belonging to level . In order to recover a data item d, we need to collect at least c/3 pieces of d. To do so, we randomly choose 5c/6 requests for pieces of d that were active at level in the Probing Stage and for each of these pieces d i we determine whether BF (s
can be decoded without congestion (as described later). If BF (s ( ) i (d)) can be decoded without congestion, the decoding is initiated and the result of this is sent back to the origin. (Throughout the whole process, we use the same combining/splitting approach of messages as in the Probing Stage.) Otherwise, the origin is informed that the according piece of d could not be decoded. If for a data item d not sufficiently many (i.e., less than c/3) pieces could be recovered, the request for d is declared to belong to level + 1 and will be considered again in the next sub-phase. Note that requests for non-existing data items may be handled in the Decoding Stage. However, these can be treated as existing items (with the only difference being that one intact server taking part in the decoding is sufficient to tell that the data item does not exist). A visualization of a sub-phase of the decoding stage can be found in the appendix.
In the following, we describe the operation of any sub-phase in more detail. First of all, each server s that is responsible for a lookup request of a data item d that belongs to level chooses 5c/6 among the at least 5c/6 indices of pieces of d that were active at level in the Probing Stage. For such a piece d i of d with current timestamp t, s sends a decode(d, i, t) message from s
which is done by simply routing through the k-ary butterfly into the direction of h i (d) for rounds). In order to determine whether BF (v) can be decoded without congestion, v first checks whether it is congested, i.e., it received more than βck decode(·) messages for a sufficiently large constant β and, if not, then issues a decodeCHECK(d, i) message, which is spread to all nodes in U T (v). During this spreading, whenever a further forwarding of all messages received by a node u at a level − κ, 1 ≤ κ < , could lead to congestion (i.e., u received more than βck decodeCHECK(d , i ) messages for distinct (d , i ) pairs), u stops the forwarding of all messages and instead spreads a cong(·) message in BF (u). In addition, it sends a fail(·) message to all neighbors at level − κ + 1. Each node on a level , − κ + 1 ≤ < , that receives such a fail(·) message forwards this message to all neighbors at level + 1 from which it received a decodeCHECK(·) mesage. By this it is ensured that whenever a node in BF (u) is congested each node v at level with v ∈ BF (u) receives a fail(·) message after at most 2 rounds. Each node u at level − κ, 1 ≤ κ < , that received a cong() message initiates the same spreading of cong() messages in U T (u ). If v had not been congested before the spreading and v has not received any fail(·) message after 2 rounds, it knows that any piece of a data item for which v received a decode(·) message can be decoded if not outdated nodes in BF (v) forbid this. Thus, it initiates the decoding for each of the pieces, which may fail due to outdated nodes. If the decoding is possible, it recovers all of these pieces within O( ) communication rounds with a congestion of at most βck 2 per node (using the distributed decoding described in [7] ). These are then forwarded to the origins of the requests. If, however the decoding fails, or if v was congested or received a fail(·) message, it sends a fail(·) message to the origins of the decode(·) messages it received (which, again, are forwarded up to the initiator of that decode(·) message). Finally, if a server s that is responsible for a lookup request of a data item d receives at least c/3 successfully decoded pieces, it determines d and answers the request. Otherwise, it changes the request to belong to level + 1 such that it will be processed again in the next sub-phase.
It is easy to see that the Decoding Stage satisfies the following property: Corollary 4.5. RoBuSt correctly serves any set of lookup and write requests (with one request per intact server) in at most O(log 4 n) communications rounds, with a congestion of at most O(log 3 n) at every server in each round and a redundancy of O(log n) even if up to 1/72 · n 1/ log log n servers are crashed.
Conclusion and Future Work
We presented the first scalable distributed storage system that is provably robust against batch-based crash failures with up to γn 1/ log log n crashes allowed (γ > 0 constant). An interesting question that has not been investigated in this work is whether the techniques that enabled the Enhanced IRIS system [7] to tolerate a larger number of failed servers could be adapted for RoBuSt in order to increase the number of crashed servers allowed up to n (for some constant > 0) while (as a minor drawback) also increasing the redundancy to O(log n), such as it is the case in Enhanced IRIS.
Moreover, while we assume batch-based failures, it would be interesting to see whether a scalable distributed storage system can be designed that can tolerate failures occuring at arbitrary points in time. Dealing with a similar issue, it would also be interesting to enhance our system to allow dynamics (i.e. joins and leaves of servers) in our system in order to model P2P networks.
A further interesting challenge is to enhance our distributed storage system such that additional types of attacks can be handled, for example Byzantine attacks. about bucket B z , for the same reason. Thus, less than 2 log k n servers can have none or outdated pieces of data items. Then, from Claim 2.17 of [7] it follows that all pieces can be recovered at level 0.
Note that the c hash functions for the pieces of a data items were been chosen uniformly and independently at random when B z was encoded, and after the adversary had decided on the set of blocked servers. Thus, each server holds O(log n) pieces for bucket B z , w.h.p. Furthermore, each server maintains at most one data item, w.h.p. This implies that the above process yields a congestion of at most O(log n) w.h.p.
All in all, we have:
Lemma 5.1. After log k n + 1 rounds with a congestion of O(log n) at each server in each round w.h.p., each server s(i) maintaining a data item d in B z completely knows d, w.h.p.
Details on Counting and Selection
In the following we describe the process of determining the number of data items in D(B z ) ∪ D z and the elements of the set D z+1 (if necessary) for a phase z in a distributed fashion in more detail. For the set D z of data items to be inserted into B z , we denote by D z,i ⊆ D z the set of data items with a write request at server s(i). Furthermore, we denote by B z,i ⊆ D(B z ) the set of data items from bucket B z that server s(i) maintains. First of all, each server s(i), i ∈ {1, . . . , n} initializes a tuple (num 0 , num 1 ) where num j , j ∈ {0, 1}, is the number of data items d ∈ B z,i ∪ D z,i with bit d (z + 1) = j. These tuples are now forwarded bottom up in the underlying k-ary butterfly, where each intermediate node sums up all tuples it received and forwards the result to the next smaller level. More precisely, each server s(i) first sends its tuple (num 0 , num 1 ) to each of the k neighbors of the node (log k n, i) in the underlying k-ary butterfly. Any intermediate node v on level , 0 < < log k n, sets num j , j ∈ {0, 1}, as the sum of all k received num j -values and sends the tuple (num 0 , num 1 ) to its k neighbors on level − 1 in the underlying k-ary butterfly. Finally, a server s(i) on level 0, sums up all tuples received from neighbors on level 1 and stores the result in (num 0 , num 1 ). The following lemma is easy to check.
Lemma 5.2. After log k n rounds, each server s(i) knows the number of data items d ∈ D(B z ) ∪ D z with bit d (z + 1) = j for all j ∈ {0, 1}. Additionally, in every round, each server s sends and receives at most 2k messages.
The servers can now compute size(B z ) := num 0 + num 1 and check whether size(B z ) > 2n. If this is not the case, the current bucket is reencoded together with the items from D r (see Section 3.2.1) and the Writing Stage finished. Otherwise the servers need to degree on the bucket and a set D z+1 of n data items from D(B z ) ∪ D z to be handled in the next phase. Whether this bucket is either 0-child(B z ) or 1-child(B z ) depends on the number of data items with the same (z + 1)-st bit in D z ∪ D(B z ). I.e., if num 0 > n the next bucket is B z+1 :=0-child(B z ) and we set j := 0, otherwise the next bucket is B z+1 :=1-child(B z ) and we set j := 1. Then, since size(B z ) > 2n, num j > n must hold.
In the following, the servers determine the set D z+1 of n data items that will be propagated to bucket B z+1 , as required in step 3c. This is done by a top-down approach in the tree LT ((0, 0) ) of the k-ary butterfly. In the following, we assume that each node v in LT ((0, 0)) during the first part (the bottom-up counting) stored the tuples (t 1,0 , t 1,1 ), (t 2,0 , t 2,1 ) , . . . , (t k,0 , t k,1 ) it received from its children v 1 , . . . , v k in LT ((0, 0)) and is now still able to determine the value of t i,j , i ∈ {1, . . . , k}. Furthermore, the nodes exchange two different types of messages during this step: full and partly(x), x ∈ N. At the beginning, (0, 0) issues partly(size(B z )) on itself. Depending on the message a node v receives, it performs the actions described in the following. If v is not on level log k n, let v 1 , . . . , v k denote the children of v in LT ((0, 0) ).
partly(x):
Determine the greatest index b such that y ≤ x with y :=
full: If v is not on level log k n, v sends a full-message to each of its children in LT ((0, 0)).
If v is on level log k n, the server emulating v removes all data items d ∈ B z,i ∪ D z,i with bit d (z + 1) = j. These data items belong to D z+1 and will be handled in the next phase as if the server emulating v has a new write request for them.
The following lemma is easy to check:
Lemma 5.3. After log k n additional rounds it holds:
1. Each server s(i) knows which of the data items in B z,i ∪ D z,i are supposed to be encoded in bucket B z again and which of them are propagated to the next phase.
2. In every round, each server s sends and receives at most 2k messages.
3. The number of data items that are decided to belong to bucket B z (and thus will be encoded in this bucket) is at most 2n.
It remains to distribute for each data item from D z+1 a write request among the n servers such that each server s(i) is responsible for exactly one of these write requests. This distribution can easily be achieved by using standard techniques for load balancing in the butterfly in O(log n) rounds and a congestion of O(log n) at each server.
Additional Proofs
Proof of Lemma 3.1
Proof. In the following, we denote a sub-butterfly BF (v) for some v ∈ V at level as blocked at level if at least 2 −1 servers in BF (v) are crashed (note that we need the ceiling function only for the special case = 0). Let d be a data item, and let 0 ≤ ≤ log k n be a fixed level in the underlying k-ary butterfly. First of all, we show that the fraction of blocked sub-butterflies at level is at most γ. Using the Chernoff bounds [4] , we can conclude from this that the number of pieces of d that are mapped to blocked sub-butterflies are at most c/6 with high probability.
Recall that each sub-butterfly at level contains exactly k servers. Obviously, for = 0, the fraction of crashed servers at level is upper bounded by γ/2 < γ. Thus, in the following, we assume 1 ≤ ≤ log k n. Let b be the number of blocked sub-butterflies at level . Then, there exist at least b · 2 −1 crashed servers. On the other hand, the adversary can block only less than γ/2 · 2 log k n servers. Hence, b · 2 −1 < γ · 2 log k n−1 which is equivalent to b < γ · 2 log k n− . Recall that there are exactly k log k n− sub-butterflies at level . This yields that the fraction of blocked sub-butterflies at level is at most γ · 2 log k n− k log k n− ≤ γ. Using the Chernoff bounds it is easy to show that at most c/6 pieces of d are mapped to a blocked subbutterfly, w.h.p.
Proof of Lemma 4.2
In order to proof Lemma 4.2 we need to introduce the following definitions: 
ir (d)) with l i ≥ , r = c/6, and i 1 , . . . , i r being pairwise different.
As a crucial ingredient for the proof of Lemma 4.2, we require the hash functions h 1 , . . . , h c to satisfy a certain expansion property, which holds if the hash functions are chosen uniformly and independently at random, w.h.p.. For this, we need the following definitions.
Definition 5.6 (b-bundle). Given a set S ⊂ U of keys and a k ∈ N, we call F ⊆ S × {1, . . . , c} a b-bundle of S if every d ∈ S has exactly b many pairs (d, i) in F .
Definition 5.7 ((b, σ)-expander).
For any sub-butterfly B let V (B) be the set of servers emulating the nodes of B. Let H be a collection of hash functions h 1 , . . . , h c . Given h 1 , . . . , h c and a level ∈ {0, . . . , log k n}, we define Γ F, (S) :
. Given a 0 < σ < 1, we call H a (b, σ)-expander if for any 0 ≤ < log k n, any S ⊆ U with |S| ≤ σn/k , and any b-bundle F of S, it holds that |Γ F, (S)| ≥ k |S|.
The following Claim can be proven analogously to Claim 2.13 of [2] .
Claim 5.8. 1 If the hash functions H = {h 1 , . . . , h c } are chosen uniformly and independently at random, m = |U | sufficiently large, and c ≥ 18 log m, then H is a (c/6, 1/36)-expander, w.h.p.
Using these definitions, we can say that whenever a data item d is declared to belong to level , then at least c/6 probe(d, i, t d ) messages have been deactivated at level or higher because of congested sub-butterflies. Thus, if many data items belong to level , then many sub-butterflies must be congested at level . However, as we will prove, only a γ-fraction of the sub-butterflies can be congested at level , which implies that only a γ-fraction of all data items can belong to level .
The proof of Lemma 4.2 follows the line of Lemma 2.16 in [7] with the main differences being the definition of when a node belongs to level (here we need at least 5c/6 active probes) and the value of γ.
Proof of Lemma 4.2: The idea of the proof is the following: Let ∈ {1, . . . , log k n}. First, the number of data items of which at least c 6 of its c pieces are deactivated at level or earlier due to too many blocked nodes (which we call blocked at level ) is bounded. These are at most γn/k . Second, the number of data items of which at least c 6 of its c pieces are deactivated at level or earlier due to congested nodes (which we call congested at level ) is bounded. These are also at most γn/k . For all other data items, less than c/6 pieces of them are deactivated due to congestion and less than c/6 pieces of them are deactivated due to blocked nodes, which means that less than c/3 pieces of them are deactivated at all (at level or earlier). These pieces, then, must belong to a level < (by definition). Thus, at most 2γn/k data items belong to level .
Fix 1 ≤ ≤ log k n. As mentioned before, we will now bound the number of data items that are congested at level . Let S be a maximum set of data items that are congested at level . We will show: |S| < γn/k . As in the proof of Lemma 4.4, we construct a c/6-bundle F of S (adding, for each d ∈ S, c/6 indices i to F with the property that BF (s
. We first show that for α sufficiently large, less than a fraction of γ of all butterflies at level can be congested. Recall that a sub-butterfly on level is congested if it receives more than αck /2 probes for different (d, i)-pairs. Let δ be the maximum fraction of servers the adversary may block. Since there are at most (1 − δ)n lookup requests in total, at most c(1 − δ)n probes arrive at level . Thus, at most c(1 − δ)n/(αck /2) = 2(1 − δ)n/(αk ) sub-butterflies can be congested at level . Since there are exactly n/k disjoint sub-butterflies at level , the fraction of congested sub-butterflies at level is upper bounded by 2(1 − δ)/α ≤ 2/α. Hence, for α > 2/γ, less than a γ-fraction of the sub-butterflies on level can be congested. That is, all of the congested sub-butterflies BF (s (l i ) i (d) with (d, i) ∈ F together contain less than a γ-fraction of the sub-butterflies on level . This implies |Γ F, (S)| < γn.
On the other hand, from Claim 2, we can deduce that for any c/6-bundle F of S with |S | ≥ γn/k , |Γ F, (S )| ≥ γk . By assuming for contradiction that |S| ≥ γn/k , we can deduce that |Γ F, (S)| ≥ γk , which is a contradiction in this case, too. Thus, |S| < γn/k . Therefore, less than γn/k are congested at level . For the remaining data items, at least 5c/6 pieces are not congested. Thus, these data items do not belong to level . Since was chosen arbitrarily, this finishes the proof. Proof of Claim 2: Assume a data item d is neither congested nor blocked. This means that less than c/6 pieces of d are congested and less than c/6 pieces of d are blocked. The latter implies that for the remaining pieces of d, the adversary blocks less than 2 −1 servers from the sub-BFs BF (s
. . of d. By Lemma 3.1, for all but c/6 of these pieces, less than 2 −1 of the servers in BF (s
. . can be outdated regarding d. Thus, for all but c/6 of these pieces, less than 2 −1 + 2 −1 = 2 servers can be crashed our outdated, which, by Claim 2.17 of [7] means that these pieces can be recovered. Thus, at most c/6 pieces of the data items that are neither blocked nor congested can fail due to outdated servers.
Proof of Claim 3:
First of all, we prove that the number of blocked data items in sub-phase is upper bounded by γn/k . Let S be a maximum set of data items that are blocked at level . We will show: |S| < γn/k . Recall that a data item d is blocked at level if there exist at least r = c/6 sub-butterflies BF (s 
Then, F is a c/6-bundle of S. Since a sub-butterfly of level contains k servers in total, and since a blocked sub-butterfly of level contains at least 2 −1 crashed nodes, a 2 −1 /k fraction of the servers of a blocked sub-butterfly of level are crashed, which is at least 2 log k n−1 /n for any 1 ≤ ≤ log k n. Therefore, if the adversary can only block less than (γ/2) · 2 log k n servers, then the number of servers covered by all BF (s ( ) i (d)) with (d, i) ∈ F must be less than γn. Since Γ F, (S) is exactly the set of these servers, it holds: |Γ F, (S)| < γn.
On the other hand, we know from Claim 2 that for any c/6-bundle F of S with |S | ≤ (1/36)n/k , |Γ F , (S )| ≥ |S |k . Since γ = 1/36, this implies that for any c/6-bundle F of S with |S | ≥ γn/k , |Γ F , (S )| ≥ γn. Now, assume for contradiction that |S| ≥ γn/k . This yields |Γ F, (S)| ≥ γn, which is a contradiction to what we said before. Hence, the number of blocked data items at level is at most γn/k .
For the upper bound on the number of congestion data items, recall that we denote a sub-butterfly BF (v) of a node v as congested if the server in BF (v) receive more than βck decode messages for different (d, i)-pairs. For β := 3, it holds that βck > 5ϕc/(6γ), which implies that a congested sub-butterfly BF (v) of a node v receives more than 5ϕc/(6γ) decode(d, i, t) messages for different d and i. By the induction hypothesis and due to the fact that we send 5c/6 decode(·) messages per data item, there are at most 5c/6 · ϕn/k decode(·) messages in total, which means that there are less than ϕn/k · 5c/6 · 6γ/(5cφ) = γn/k congested sub-butterflies of dimension .
Let S be a set of data items congested at level . Similar to the previous part about blocked data items, we can construct a c/6-bundle F for S. Since there are less than γn/k congested sub-butterflies of dimension , it holds |S| < γn/k . Thus, Claim 2 can be applied, yielding |Γ F, (S)| ≥ k |S|. Furthermore, since each sub-butterfly of dimension contains k nodes, less than γn servers can be congested, i.e., |Γ F, (S)| < γn. Together, this implies |S| < γn/k . Now we are read to proof Lemma 4.4. The proof is similar to the proof of Lemma 2.21 of [7] with the main difference being that we additionally need to handle outdated data items here.
Proof of Lemma 4.4: In the following, let γ = 1/36 and ϕ = γ(k + 2). We prove the lemma by induction on . The basis ( = 1) holds by Lemma 4.2. For the induction step, let ∈ {1, . . . , log k n − 1} and assume that the induction hypothesis holds. We show that the number of data items that will be propagated to level + 1 is at most γn/k . This means that at the beginning of sub-phase + 1, at most γn/k + 2γn/k +1 data items belong to level + 1, which is equal to γn/k +1 and thus proves the induction step.
Recall that in sub-phase , requests for 5c/6 pieces of each data item belonging to level are sent. Note that any request for a piece d i of a data item d in sub-phase of the Decoding Stage can only be aborted for one of the following three reasons: First, that too many servers storing information about d i are crashed in the current period. Second, that too many servers storing information about d i are outdated (i.e., they were crashed when the bucket storing d was last updated). Third, due to congestion in sub-phase of the Decoding Stage. However, it can be shown that if at least c/6 requests for a data item d are aborted due to too many crashed nodes, then d is blocked and if at least c/6 requests for a data item d are aborted due to congestion, then d is congested w.h.p. The former claim is an implication of Claim 2.17 of [7] , and the proof of the latter claim is analogous to Claim 2.18 of [7] . Claim 2 now implies that for the data items which are neither blocked nor congested, at least 5c/6 − c/6 − c/6 − c/6 = c/3 pieces can be recovered correctly, which means that they can be answered after sub-phase . With Claim 3 we have that all but 2γn/k requests can be answered after sub-phase .
As stated at the beginning of the proof, this suffices to prove the induction step and thus completes the proof of the lemma. Meaning and Notes n number of servers in the system m size of universe of all possible keys, polynomial in n c set to value ≥ 18 log m which is the number of pieces into which each data item is split before encoding it with RS codes k set to O(log n), system uses k-ary butterfly as underlying topology γ set to 1/72 and used in the term γn 1/ log log n that denotes the maximum number of crashed servers allowed p positive constant in term p log n which is the length of an address Λ set to p log n which is the length of an address γn 1/ log log n upper bound for the number of crashed servers the system can tolerate log k n depth of the underlying k-ary butterfly c/3 number of pieces of a data item needed to recover that data item 
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